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Abstract
In this paper we test the existence of a reputation premium in the context of the annuity
market in Chile. This market provides an exceptionally good setting to measure consumers’
willingness to pay: retirees choose between a set of offers that vary only in the quote and the risk
rating –a measure of the firm’s solvency– within each class of product. We find that willingness to
pay for the reputation linked to the firm’s risk rating is statistically and economically significant.
We also find a strong relationship between willingness to pay and intermediation choice, and we
explore four potential sources of correlation between them.
1 Introduction
There is a large theoretical literature that studies reputation as a mechanism to solve the adverse
selection problem under incomplete information, and as a disciplinary device that may restore in-
centives for high effort under moral hazard (see Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2006) for excellent reviews of this literature). In this setting, reputation is the con-
sumers’ belief about the provider’s type and/or his equilibrium behavior: a “good reputation” is
related to a high probability that the firm provides a “good service”. On the demand side, the
cited mechanism requires that consumers are willing to pay a higher price to better reputed firms,
which also requires that their willingness to pay for the product increases as its quality improves.
Unfortunately there is scarce empirical evidence of a positive relationship between reputations and
prices (see for instance Lei (2011), Jolivet et al. (2013), and Saeedi (2014)). There are three main
problems for testing this relationship: reputation is well defined in theory but hard to measure in
practice, products are complex and differ in many attributes unobserved by the econometrician, and
only transaction prices are usually available instead of the set of prices faced by the consumer.
We provide evidence for a positive relationship between reputation and prices on the demand
side. For this, we estimate the consumers’ willingness to pay for firm’s reputation using data from
the annuity market in Chile. This is a very good environment to study this problem, because we
can solve the three problems described above.
From the consumers’ point of view –the retiree–, immediate annuities are homogeneous prod-
ucts that differ only in a few observable attributes. A mandatory system for retirement products
centralizes all communication between the two sides of the market and makes annuity offers partic-
ularly simple to compare. Retirees request quotes for annuities with different attributes and receive
a set of offers that only differ in the payouts, the attributes, and the risk rating of each insurer.
Participating insurers are restricted to give quotes only to the annuities requested, and consequently
differentiation in attributes is not a decision of the firms; the only possible quality differentiation
is related to the firms’ solvency. Retirees are explicitly told that the risk rating measures insurers’
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default risk, and so we consider rating as a public signal of solvency; in this sense, estimating will-
ingness to pay for a better risk rating is regarded the same as estimating willingness to pay for a
higher reputation of solvency.
We observe all quotes received by all retirees from all participating insurers from 2004 to 2013.
We define two quotes as belonging to the same class of product if they share the same attributes.
A significant fraction of retirees chose an insurer that did not offer the highest payout within the
same class. This behavior is more frequent for retirees that chose insurers with better risk rating,
both in the cross section and over time. Indeed, 70% of retirees chose an offer from an insurer rated
AA or better; of these, only 45% accepted the offer with the highest quote in its class. In contrast,
of the other 30% of retirees who chose an offer from an insurer rated worse than AA, 76% accepted
the offer with the highest payout in its class. This evidence suggests that retirees may be willing to
pay for providers with less default risk.
As can be expected, this pattern summarizes a great amount of individual heterogeneity. In
particular, retirees may have different a priori preferences for the different insurers; for example,
firms with better rating may advertise more and increase the preference for them. Even though
economic models have standard methods for dealing with these issues, another interesting feature
of the market analyzed is that we can use the choice of an intermediary as additional information
to improve on those methods.
Retirees can enter the mandatory system with the intermediation of a sales agent –hired by an
insurance company– or an independent adviser –hired by the retiree herself. The use of a sales
agent may indicate, at least partially, that the retiree has a larger preference for that insurer; we
can include this decision as a first stage in the model, to characterize in more detail the dispersion
of preferences.
Indeed, the fraction of retirees that chose an offer from an insurer rated AA or better rises
to 83% among those using a sales agent and declines to 53% among those using an independent
adviser. Moreover, the fraction of retirees that accepted the offer with the highest payout in its class
declines to only 28% among those using a sales agent and is 76% among those using an independent
adviser. In other words, retirees intermediated by sales agents tend to choose better-rated companies
that offer lower payouts, while those intermediated by independent advisers tend to choose worse-
rated companies that offer higher payouts. This correlation may indicate that financial advice has
heterogeneous impact on the clients’ risk-taking behavior (see Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) for a
theoretical analysis and a good review of related empirical work), but it may also indicate that
those retirees with a larger preference for better-rated companies tend to use sales agents from
those insurers as intermediaries and choose their offers even if they offer lower payouts.
Taking advantage of the detailed individual-level data available, we estimate a two-stage discrete
choice model where individuals sequentially choose intermediaries and annuities. Using a mixed
logit specification to allow for flexible patterns of substitution, we estimate the willingness to pay for
reputation of solvency. We find that willingness to pay for reputation in the anniuty market in Chile
is statistically and economically significant: retirees are willing to reduce their lifetime payments
up to 2% on average in order to contract an annuity to a better rated company, depending on the
retiree’s characteristics and intermediation. Willingness to pay is significantly lower among retirees
entering the system with an independent adviser than with a sales agent.
The model admits four potential sources of correlation between willingness to pay and interme-
diaries. The first source is selection on observables: some observable characteristics of firms may
affect both the choice of intermediary and of annuity quotes. Indeed, the results show that retirees
are more likely to choose sales agents from larger companies and from better-rated companies. In
other words, the firm’s rating affects both the value of the intermediary and of the annuity quote
for that firm.
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The second source is selection on unobservables: unmeasured brand characteristics have an
aggregate effect that is fixed over time (so a standard firm-level fixed effect is included to capture
the potential correlation between these brand characteristics and the payouts) and an idiosyncratic
effect that may be correlated with the value of the intermediary, so retirees with a larger preference
for an insurer may choose both a sales agent and a quote from that company. Our results suggest
that the correlation between unobservable tastes for the firms in the first stage and unobservable
tastes for offers placed by those firms in the second stage is not significant, and zero for many firms.
The third source of correlation is general biased advice: independent advisers and sales agents
may focus their advice on different attributes of each annuity, affecting differently the valuation
of these attributes. The results suggest that this source of correlation is important: the mean
valuation of the payouts is larger for retirees whose intermediaries are independent advisers, but
also the willingness to pay for better rating is lower, than for retirees whose intermediaries are sales
agents.
Finally, the fourth source of correlation is firm-specific biased advice: sales agents only receive
commission if retirees choose a quote from their firm, so they may emphasize the value of their
firm’s quotes over other firms, and sales agents from better-rated companies may over-emphasize
the importance of firms’ solvency in order to convince their clients to accept their offer. Our results
show that this effect is also important: among retirees entering the system with a sales agent, the
mean valuation of the payment is lower for the offers placed by their agent’s firm; this translates
into an even higher willingness to pay for a better rating for this specific firm.
The welfare implications of the four sources of correlation may be very different. The evaluation
of the welfare impact of biased advise is non-trivial, however, as there is a trade-off between payments
and default risk: retirees being advised to select quotes with higher payments may be subject to
a higher default risk. Besides performing administrative tasks, intermediaries provide advice that
influences their clients’ belief updating about the firms’ types; conflict of interest may certainly
introduce bias in the advice of sales agents, but also provides an effective channel for better-rated,
solvent firms, to attract customers.
The magnitude of the estimated willingness to pay for risk rating implies that better-rated
firms can earn significant higher profits than lower-rated firms, supporting the hypothesis of the
theoretical literature on the existence of a reputation premium that may provide incentives in a
market for an experience good. Our preliminary analysis suggests that better-rated firms charge
higher prices: the fraction of quotes that are the highest in its class is lower for firms with better
risk ratings than for firms with worse ratings. However, the study of the supply side of the market
is left for future work.
Beyond testing the existence of a reputation premium, our results may also be important for
the particular analysis of the annuity market. Consider for instance the welfare effect of insurance
portfolio transfers: pensioners that buy annuities from better-rated firms are willing to accept lower
payments in exchange of a lower default probability; this benefit is lost, however, when their policies
are unilaterally transferred by the insurance company to other worse-rated firms. In light of our
results, this loss may be equivalent to a loss of 1% to 2% of pensioners’ lifetime income, which is
not trivial.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 introduce the main characteristics of the
annuity market in Chile and the data available respectively. Section 4 develops a two-stage model
where individuals sequentially choose intermediaries and annuities. Section 5 describes the estima-
tions, while Section 5.1 shows the resulting willingness to pay for risk rating. Section 6 concludes.
3
Related literature
By now there is a long theoretical literature that analyzes the role of the reputation premium in pro-
viding incentives for good performance and fostering the operation of the market under information
asymmetries. Klein and Leﬄer (1981) studies how repeat-purchase may suffice to keep incentives
aligned, as long as the market punishment for bad behavior –i.e., losing customers or charging lower
prices– is high enough to compensate for the differential cost of high quality. This analysis was first
introduced in a symmetric information environment, and incomplete information was introduced
later in the literature as a key ingredient (as in Mailath and Samuelson, 2001). Although most of the
literature focuses on the monopoly case, competition among firms under reputation concerns has
also been theoretically studied, as in Tadelis (1999), Tadelis (2002) and Rob and Fishman (2005).
There is also a growing empirical literature that focuses on reputation markets. The evidence
reported by McDevitt (2011) and Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) supports the hypothesis that repu-
tation is a state variable that affects firm’s behavior at the individual level and determines industry
dynamics under reputation concerns, as exit is more likely subsequent to poor consumer reviews
or complaints in some industries. The eBay feedback system has been studied in some detail (see
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) for a good review of the literature), as it provides a good setting to an-
alyze the evolution of consumers’ and sellers’ decisions across time. Lei (2011), Jolivet et al. (2013)
and Saeedi (2014) are some of the recent papers that try to measure the reputation premium.
2 The annuity market in Chile
The Chilean pension system is composed of two phases (see Larrain and Morales (2010)). On the
accumulation phase, dependent workers are mandated to save monthly; savings are collected and
managed by private pension fund administrator companies (“Administradoras de Fondos de Pen-
sión”, AFP). On the payout phase, retirees receive their savings back gradually over time by choosing
among four different retirement options: annuities, programmed withdrawals, or two different com-
binations of them. A detailed description of the retirement options is provided in Appendix A.1.
Even though most countries show low annuitization rates, the market in Chile is fairly large: in
our data 38.6% of retirees chose immediate annuities. The interface between the accumulation and
payout phases is the mandatory SCOMP system (“Sistema de Consultas y Ofertas de Montos de
Pensión”). This section explains the operation of this system and highlights the features that are
important when looking at the data.
2.1 Information available through SCOMP
SCOMP is a mandatory electronic system for retirement products where all the information of the
pension process is centralized and shared to the relevant parties: retirees request quotes, information
about the retiree and her beneficiaries is transferred to pension providers, providers give quotes, and
retirees choose their preferred quote. The system maximizes the information available to retirees
while restricting the information available to insurance companies. A summary of the information
available to each participant is the following:
i. Information about the retiree: The information transferred to providers (insurers and AFPs) in-
cludes only basic demographic characteristics of the retiree and her beneficiaries (age, gender,
dissability status), her retirement status (early or normal retirement), the size and compo-
sition of her pension savings fund, and the attributes of the annuities she requested. Other
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information is unobserved by providers: in particular, the identity of the retiree and her ben-
eficiaries, socioeconomic information as area of residence, and also the type and identity of
the intermediary she is using.
ii. Information about the payout quotes: Annuities are single premium products, irreversible,
with fixed payouts in real terms (payouts are quoted in UF, an indexed unit of account that
is the standard currency for long term contracts in Chile), and are deposited monthly in a
bank account. Payout quotes are privately offered to each retiree and are personalized –they
depend on the information transferred to providers described in i. They are not disclosed at
any moment to providers or the market, neither during or after the retirement process. It
is not straightforward to infer individual prices from the quotes: the implicit price that the
insurer charges depends on his prediction of the retiree’s life expectancy, the performance of
the economy, and his return on investments, and on the provisions mandated by the regulatory
agency.
iii. Information about the providers: Each retiree is given a certificate that includes the quotes,
name and risk rating of each participating company. The certificate explicitly indicates that
the risk rating is a measure of the default probability of the insurer. If the insurance company
goes bankrupt the state guarantees only part of the payment up to a limit; however, neither
the level of the guaranty, its operation, or limit is informed in the certificate.1
iv. Information about the intermediary’s fee: Offers are net of intermediary’s fee and the retiree
is told that payouts may increase if that fee is reduced. A maximum fee is set for both
sales agents and financial advisers. We observe all the offers received by each retiree, both
initial offers and subsequent counteroffers; counteroffers must include higher payouts, either
by reductions of the intermediary’ fee or by improvements of the insurer’s offer.
A more detailed description of the retirement process is provided in Appendix A.2.
2.2 Attributes of annuities
When buying an annuity, the retiree transfers the property of the savings fund to the insurance
company in exchange for a lifetime monthly payment fixed in real terms; standard annuities start
paying immediately. Annuities may differ in only two attributes: guaranteed period and lump sum
withdrawal.
The guaranteed period extends the number of months in which the company pays. The law
requires that if the retiree dies the legal beneficiaries will continue receiving a percentage of the
monthly payment. Under an annuity with guaranteed period, if the retiree dies before the end of
the selected period, the whole payment will be paid to the beneficiaries until it ends, after which
1The state’s guaranty corresponds to the minimum pension in addition to 75% of the difference between the
monthly payment and this minimum pension –if positive– up to 45UF. The minimum pension is determined by law
and depends on the age of the retiree. Additionally, the regulatory agency may authorize the transfer of active
contracts and available funds to a different insurance company that will continue making payments for a given period
of time; after that period, surviving policy holders will receive the state’s guaranty. The most recent experience of
bankruptcy in Chile was in January 2004. The regulatory agency paid pensions until February 2008, when policies
were transferred through a bidding process to another insurance company that committed to continue paying 100%
of the annuities until May 2018. The financial strength of the company not only affects the probability that the
company will go bankrupt, but also the output of this bidding process, as it influences the decision made by the
bidding companies.
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payments will continue as legally required. This feature acts as a form of inheritance, particularly
for non-legal beneficiaries.2
On the other hand, if the size of the pension savings fund is sufficiently high, the retiree may also
request a lump sum withdrawal (“Excedente de Libre Disposición”) that is removed from the savings
fund. The maximum withdrawal allowed is such that enough funds are left to buy an annuity with
a monthly payment of 70% of the average wage from the previous 10 years, and at least 150% of
the minimal pension –same requisites than for early retirement. If elegible, the retiree can request
quotes for annuities with no withdrawal, the maximum, or some amount in between. If the retiree
requests zero or other fixed amount of withdrawal the companies may compete offering different
monthly payments; if the retiree requests the maximum withdrawal the companies must fix the
monthly payment to the amount specified above and may compete offering different withdrawals.
A request for quotes may include combinations of up to three lengths of guaranteed periods and
three lump sum specifications (if eligible). Let us define the class of an annuity offer as the subset
of quotes received by a retiree that share the same attributes. Two offers are in the same class if:
i. [Zero or fixed withdrawal] the length of the guaranteed period and the size of the withdrawal
requested are the same, or
ii. [Maximum withdrawal] the length of the guaranteed period is the same and the withdrawal
requested is the maximum allowed.
In case (i) all offers in the same class share the same withdrawal but differ in terms of the
monthly payments. In this case the highest payout in its class is the offer with the highest monthly
payment in this subset. In contrast, in case (ii) all offers in the same class share the same monthly
payment (the minimum annuity with withdrawal) but differ in terms of the withdrawal. In this case
the highest payout in its class is the offer with the highest withdrawal in this subset.
The certificate sent to the retiree provides a different table of quotes for each class requested.
Each quote in each table shows the name of the company, the payout (the monthly payment and
withdrawal), the risk rating, and the discount rate if the annuity includes a guaranteed period. The
offers are ordered by payout, from larger to smaller, and from best to worst risk rating in case of a
tie. This system makes annuity offers particularly simple to compare for the retiree.
2.3 Intermediaries
To start the retirement process, the retiree must enter a request for quotes into the system through
an intermediary. The system considers four different intermediation options. The first one is to go
directly to an AFP, either the one that manages the retiree’s savings account or a different one.
This intermediary is the most independent but also provides the least financial advice: the person
at the office will enter all the required information into the system but will usually provide very
little and standard information about the system and will not advice the retiree on what product
is best for her.
The following two intermediation options involve a life insurer: the second one is to go directly
to a life insurance company, and the third one is a sales agent. Both options will naturally be
biased towards the company and certain pension products. And finally, the last option is to hire an
independent adviser authorized by the regulator.
2For annuities with guaranteed period, the company must also offer a discount rate. If the retiree dies before the
end of the selected period, the beneficiaries may choose to withdraw the remaining funds, paying this discount rate
–most frequently 7.5%.
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The last two intermediaries involve paying an intermediation fee, which is subtracted from the
savings fund. Intermediation fees are regulated: the maximum is 2.5% of the fund until 2008, and
2% from that date on. Because companies ignore the type of the intermediary, all quotes are entered
in the system net of the maximum intermediation fee. The adviser is paid the same fee if the retiree
chooses any annuity product, but the sales agent is only paid if the retiree chooses an annuity from
his company; both can choose to reduce their fees.3
2.4 Risk rating
In the 2004-2013 period 21 insurance companies gave quotes through the system, after taking into
account some mergers and name changes. To participate, all must obtain ratings from at least
two independent agencies and have ratings of at least BBB-; retirees receive the worst of these two
ratings. Table 1 summarizes the history of firms’ risk ratings, that fluctuate from AA+ to BBB-.
Despite the size and richness of the data set, it has two important limitations: only one company
obtains ratings BBB or BBB- in the period, creating a gap with the other companies. Hence, the
effect of obtaining a rating worse than A- cannot be separately identified from that firm’s fixed
effect. Additionally, variation within companies over time is infrequent, and in all but one case it is
between two adjacent ratings.
3 The Data
The data set contains all the requested and received quotes for all retirement processes in the
period between 2004 and 2013. The quotes consist of the name and risk rating of each participating
company, the payouts (i.e., the monthly payment and withdrawal, if any), and the attributes that
define the class as described in section 2.2.
Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of pension products and intermediary types respectively.
Our sample consists of 85,105 retirees with almost four million quotes. These correspond to the
retirees that chose an immediate annuity, a 38.58% of all the persons that retire through the system
–both standard and early retirement. Regarding intermediation, 20.2% of the sample go directly
to an AFP. The rest of the sample is split between those that use an independent advisor (39.6%)
and an insurance company (40.2%). Of those that use an insurance company, most of them use a
sales agent, and a few go directly to the company. This subgroup (3.3% of the sample) is supposed
to not pay any fees, but in the data almost all of them end up paying some fee at the end of the
process; thus we assume that the insurance companies redirect them to one of their agents, and we
will treat them as the same category in estimation.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the percentage of accepted quotes with the highest
payout in its class and the companies’ rating and size –measured as the number of accepted quotes.
Each bubble represents an insurer at a given rating grade; those with two different ratings in the
period are represented with two connected bubbles. The bubble’s size represents the number of
accepted quotes from this company at the corresponding rating grade. The horizontal axis shows
the risk rating, while the vertical axis shows the ratio of accepted quotes with the highest payout in
its class to total accepted quotes from each company at a given rating grade. For those companies
rates AA+ a significant fraction of the accepted quotes are not the highest in its class, but for the
worst rated company almost all the accepted quotes are the highest.
3These fees are for annuity products; in case of choosing a programmed withdrawal the adviser is only paid at most
a fee of 1.2% and the sales agent does not receive a fee. This raises another issue with the market for programmed
withdrawal that is not explored in this paper and is left for future work.
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Table 1: Number of offers and rating grade by insurance company, SCOMP 2004-2013
Brand Number of Risk rating of the Insurance company
offers (years bidding quotes within each rating category)
id period 2004-2013 AA+ AA AA- A+ A BBB BBB-
1 342,454 2005-2013 2004-2005
2 29,933 2004-2005
3 46,109 2010-2013
4 215,645 2008-2009 2004-2008
2009-2013
5 289,745 2008-2013 2004-2008 2004
6 36,508 2004-2006
7 15,392 2007-2008 2005-2007
8 50,345 2007-2008 2007
9 16,935 2005-2008
10 304,087 2004-2013
11 339,612 2004-2013
12 324,586 2004-2013
13 288,122 2007-2011 2004-2007
2012-2013 2011-2012
14 104,653 2009-2013
15 237,939 2004-2013
16 191,142 2007-2013 2005-2007
17 36,122 2008-2011
18 59,466 2011-2013
19 327,254 2012-2013 2004-2012
20 345,353 2005-2013 2004-2005
21 216,781 2013 2008-2013
Table 2: Distribution of pension products, SCOMP 2004-2013
Number of requests Number of offers
Total in the System 444,795 100.00% 18,796,012
Standard retirement 194,164 43.65% 8,737,513
Early retirement 125,605 28.24% 4,868,675
Disability pensions 55,158 12.40% 2,179,165
Pensions for beneficiaries 69,868 15.71% 3,010,659
Total retirement 319,769 100.00% 13,606,188
Did not finish process 98,897 30.93% 4,830,782
Programmed withdrawal 84,776 26.51% 2,246,273
Non-immediate annuity 50,885 15.91% 2,319,640
Immediate annuity 85,211 26.65% 4,209,493
Our sample 85,105 3,972,104
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Table 3: Distribution of intermediary types, SCOMP 2004-2013
Intermediary type Frequency Percentage
AFP 17,190 20.20%
Insurance company 2,816 3.31%
Sales agent 31,395 36.89%
Independent adviser 33,704 39.60%
The figure shows a negative correlation between these two variables. As a firm’s rating improves,
the fraction of its accepted quotes that have the highest payout in its class decreases in most cases.
Additionally, accepted quotes are less frequently the highest payout in its class among better-rated
companies. As the retiree is fully aware that she is not choosing the quote with the highest payout
in its class, we regard this negative relationship as indicative that retirees are willing to sacrifice
payouts in order to obtain a pension from a better-rated company –and companies are aware of
that, as the probability that the offers made are the highest in its class is lower for companies with
better risk ratings.
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Figure 1: Ratio of accepted quotes with the highest payout to total accepted quotes.
Conditioning on the intermediary strongly affects the results. Figure 2(a) shows the percentage
of accepted quotes with the highest payout in its class and the companies’ rating and size (exactly as
in Figure 1), but only for those retirees who use an independent adviser. The advantage of better-
rated firms tends to disappear and there is a negative but weaker relation between the rating of the
company and the ratio of highest to accepted quotes, both within and across firms. In contrast,
Figure 2(b) shows the same ratio but only for those retirees who use a sales agent. The fraction of
accepted quotes that have the highest payout in its class is strongly reduced for all ratings. The
advantage of better rated firms increases and there is a stronger relation between the rating of the
company and the ratio of highest to accepted quotes, both within and across firms.
This evidence suggest that risk rating and financial intermediation play an important role on
the market for annuities in Chile. Because the default probability is the main source of uncertainty
for retirees with respect to the quality of the product they are choosing, we can think of the risk
rating as a measure of reputation of the firm. In most industries it is difficult to test the empirical
relevance of reputation and to measure the reputation premium, as reputation is an unobservable
attribute for the econometrician. In our case, however, risk rating is explicitly included as a measure
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(a) Retirees using independent advisers.
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(b) Retirees using sales agents.
Figure 2: Ratio of highest to accepted quotes by intermediary type.
of the default probability of the insurer, hence making this variable observable both for the retirees
and for us.
4 The Model
The model considers a retiree who must choose an annuity once and for all. Retirees are indexed by
i ∈ {1, ..., I}. The decision process is modelled in two stages: the individual chooses an intermediary
of type k ∈ {1, ..,K} to enter the system in a first stage, and then chooses a quote j ∈ {1, ..., J} from
a firm f ∈ {1, ..., F} among all the quotes received in the second stage. The number of intermediary
types is K = F + 2. When the individual chooses a sales agent from firm f both indexes take on
the same value k = f ≤ F ; independent advisers are indexed by k = F + 1, and entering directly
through an AFP is denoted by k = F + 2.
To estimate heterogeneous willingness to pay for reputation of solvency, we use a mixed logit
model. The model admits four potential sources of correlation between this willingness to pay and
intermediaries. We can use the choice of intermediary as additional information to capture part of
the heterogeneity in preferences for the different insurers or attributes.
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The first source is selection on observables: some observable characteristics of firms may affect
both the choice of intermediary in the fist stage and the choice of annuity quotes in the second stage.
The second source is selection on unobservables: idiosyncratic unmeasured brand characteristics may
be correlated with the value of the intermediary, so retirees with a larger preference for an insurer
may choose both a sales agent and a quote from that company. The third source of correlation is
general biased advice: independent advisers and sales agents may focus their advice on different
attributes of each annuity, affecting differently the valuation of these attributes. Finally the fourth
source is firm-specific biased advice: sales agents may emphasize the value of their firm’s quotes
over other firms, and sales agents from better-rated companies may over-emphasize the importance
of firms’ solvency in order to convince their clients to accept their offer.
To solve for the potential correlation between the aggregate effect of unmeasured brand charac-
teristics and the quotes, we use a firm-level fixed effect, a feature that has become standard in the
literature. Because we have individual and time variation in the payouts quoted, we do not require
the usual second stage in the estimation to retrieve aggregate parameters (see, for instance, Berry
et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001)). Individual prices charged by each firm are not easily obtained, for
the reasons outlined above. Because of the centralization of the system, we can assume that firms
are only aware of this aggregate effect of their brands, but are not able to predict the idiosyncratic
effect when facing a new request for quotes, hence the firm-level fixed effect should be sufficient to
solve the endogeneity of quotes.
4.1 Utilities of the first and second stages
In the first stage, the value for individual i of choosing intermediary k is given by:
U˜ik = Wiαk +Wikα+ ε˜
1
ik + ε˜
2
ik, (1)
where Wi is a vector of individual characteristics, Wik is a vector of individual-specific attributes of
intermediary k, and the error term contains two parts: a normally distributed error ε˜1ik and an iid
Gumbel error ε˜2ik. The choice of individual i in the first stage defines a set of indicator variables as
follows:
Y˜ik =
{
1 if i chooses intermediary k, and
0 otherwise.
(2)
Conditional on the first stage choice, the value of choosing quote j from firm f in the second
stage is given by:
Uijf = Xijfβi + ξf + ε
1
if + ε
2
ijf , (3)
where Xijf is a vector of (individual-specific) attributes of the quote and firm, ξf is a firm fixed-
effect, and the error term again contains two parts: a normally distributed error ε1if and an iid
Gumbel error ε2ijf . The fixed effect ξf only varies by firm but not over time, and is included –as
standard– to control for the endogeneity of payouts: firm f is aware only of the “average” value of
the firm for consumers and this may be correlated to the implicit price charged by the firm. We
assume that the firm is not aware of the idiosyncratic value of the firm for a specific retiree.4
To complete the mixed logit specification, the valuation of the attributes of the quote βi is a
normally distributed variable that depends on individual characteristics:
βi ∼ N(λZ ′i,Σβ) (4)
4When making initial offers, the firm is not aware of the intermediation choice, and there is no communication
between the sales agent and the company. The average difference between the initial offer and subsequent counteroffers
is almost the same for retirees that enter the system through sales agents and through independent advisers.
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where Z ′i is a vector of individual’s i characteristics and Σβ is a diagonal matrix (Σβ = diag(σ
2
β)).
The choice of individual i in the second stage defines a set of indicator variables as follows:
Yijf =
{
1 if i chooses quote j from firm f , and
0 otherwise.
(5)
4.1.1 Variables and normalizations included in the model
Attributes of quotes and firms. The vector Xijf corresponds to the individual-specific at-
tributes of the quotes and firms that affect the choice in the second stage, and can be decomposed
in three parts: X1ijf is a vector of size 5 that captures the valuation of the discounted present
value of the future payments; X2ijf is a vector of size 7 that include attributes of the offer and
the insurer; finally, X3ijf is a vector of size 5 that captures the effect of entering to the system
with a sales agent from the same insurance company f that is giving the quote. The three parts
Xijf = [X
1
ijf , X
2
ijf , X
3
ijf ] are described as follows.
1. X1ijf includes the variables that enter into the discounted present value of the future payments
of the annuity. Suppose a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with Bernoulli function
ui(y) = ln(y); then the present value at time t Vit of these payments is given by
Vit(Pijf ) = ln(Pijf ) + ρipiitpiftVit+1(Pijf ) + piit(1− pift)Gijf + (1− piit)Bijf (6)
where piit is the probability that the retiree survives to the next month, pift is the probability
that the company continues making payments the next month, ρi is the monthly discount
factor and Pijf is the monthly payment. In turn, Gijf is the payment made by the state
guarantee if the company defaults as described in Section 2.1, and Bijf is the payments left
for legal beneficiaries after death as described in Section 2.2, both in present value terms and
utility units.
Consider for instance the special case where the last two terms in Equation 6 that include
Gijf and Bijf are set to zero–or that Gijf and Bijf are linear functions of Pijf .5 Under the
strong assumption that piit and pijt are constant over time, we obtain:
Vi(Pijf ) = ln(Pijf ) + ρipiipifVi(Pijf ) (7)
and
Vi(Pijf ) =
1
1− ρipiipif ln(Pijf ) (8)
Under these assumptions, the present value of the payments of the annuity depends on the
retiree’s discount factor and probability of survival, and the probability that the company
continues making payments, that depends on his risk rating.
Let r ∈ {AA+, AA,AA−, A+, A or lower} denote the risk rating. We model the relation
between r and pif in a flexible way: We define the set of risk-rating dummies {Rifr}r as
Rifr = 1 if firm f has risk rating r when i receives the quote; then
X1ijf ≡ {Rifr ln(Pijf )}r.
This is, the present value of the payments of the annuity is captured using the log-monthly
payment and interactions between the log-monthly payment and the risk rating dummies. We
leave as base alternative r = A or lower.
5The values of Gijf and Bijf are not included in the offers and are difficult to estimate for the retiree.
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2. X2ijf includes the observable attributes of the quote and firm characteristics that may affect
the value: the number of months of the guaranteed period, a dummy if the quote includes
lump sum withdrawal, the amount of the withdrawal, the size of firm f measured as the
amount of technical reserves, and the rating dummies Rfr (only for r ∈ {AA+, AA,AA−} as
other categories cannot be separately identified from ξf ).
3. X3ijf includes a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if Y˜if = 1, this is, if the retiree uses a sales
agent from the same firm that is giving the quote, and interactions of this dummy with the
variables in X1ijf . The logic for this set of variables is explained next.
Variables affecting mean valuation of quote attributes. The vector Zi corresponds to the
individual characteristics that affect the mean valuation of the quote’s attributes E(βi). The vector
also includes three parts: Zi = [ι, Z1i , Z
2
i ], where ι is a constant and:
1. Z1i of size 12 includes the demographic and financial information available: a dummy if the
retiree is female, age, a dummy if married, number of children, a dummy if she lives in the
metropolitan area, a set of two dummies that capture different AFPs the retiree may be in, size
of her savings fund, a set of dummies describing different composition of stocks and options
of her fund, and a dummy if the retiree had already obtained a programmed withdrawal and
is changing her pension product.
2. Z2i is a vector of indicator variables for the type of intermediary chosen in the first stage,
Z2i =
(
Y˜ ∗iF , Y˜i,F+1
)
(9)
where Y˜ ∗iF ≡
∑
k∈{1,...,F} Y˜ik is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if individual i chose any
sales agent in the first stage, while Y˜i,F+1 = 1 if she chose an independent adviser.
To focus on willingness to pay for reputation and avoid a curse of dimensionality, we restrict Zi = ι
to the variables in X2ijf and X
3
ijf . This is, the mean valuation of observable attributes is constant
and we only allow observable variation in the mean valuation for the present value of the annuity’s
payments; this variation represents differences in discount factors and survival probabilities.6
These variables imply that the present value of the annuity’s payments varies with individual
characteristics but also with intermediation. The effect of Z2i captures general (as opposed to
firm-specific) biased advice: independent advisers and sales agents may focus their advice on the
payments or on the risk of each annuity, affecting differently the valuation of these attributes, but
the effect is the same for all firms making quotes with similar attributes. For this reason we include
the vector X3ijf above, that captures firm-specific biased advice: sales agents may increase the
value of their firm’s quotes over other firms when Y˜if = 1, but also sales agents from better-rated
companies may over-emphasize the importance of firms’ solvency in order to convince their clients
to accept their offer, and this is included as interactions of this dummy with the variables in X1ijf .
Ideally the dummy if Y˜if = 1 would be included in Zi, but βi must only vary by i, not f . Hence we
include the dummy in Xijf with interactions, so it indirectly changes the valuation of the present
value of the annuity’s payments. Because the intention is to vary βi, we additionally assume βi = β
for the vector X3ijf (V (βi) = 0).
6We also restrict Zi = ι for Rfr ln(Pijf ) with r=A or lower, to avoid multicolinearity.
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Variables affecting choice of intermediation. The choice in the first stage is affected by Wi,
a vector of size 14 with individual characteristics, and Wik, a vector of size 7 with attributes of the
alternatives:
1. Wi corresponds to the individual characteristics that affect the value of an intermediary. The
vector also includes three parts Wi = [ι, Z1i ,W
2
i ], where ι is a constant, Z
1
i are the same
demographic and financial variables included in the valuation of attributes in the second
stage, and W 2i is a vector of individual variables used as exclusion restrictions: if the retiree
lives in a city with AFP offices available, and if the retiree’s spouse is above the retiring age,
to capture the effect of different experience with the pension process. We include the standard
normalization that αk = 0 for K = F + 2 (entering directly with an AFP).
2. Wik corresponds to individual and alternative-specific characteristics that affect the value
of an intermediary. The first three variables are included in X2ijf : rating dummies Rfr for
r ∈ {AA+, AA} and firm size measured as the amount of technical reserves. We also include
the number of sales agents of firm f available in the retiree’s area as an exclusion variable–
all this variables take value zero for k > F . The number of independent advisers available in
the area is also included for k = F + 1.
4.1.2 Correlation between willingness to pay for reputation and intermediaries
The model admits four potential sources of relation between the first and second stages. Selection
on observables is captured in α: retirees may be more likely to choose a sales agent from a better-
rated or a larger company. Selection on unobservables is captured through correlation between ε˜1ik
and ε1if when k = f : retirees with a larger preference for an insurer may have larger values and be
more likely to choose both a sales agent and a quote from that company. In particular, we assume
the following correlation structure:
Cov(ε˜1ik, ε˜
1
ik′) = 0 ∀k 6= k′
Cov(ε1if , ε
1
if ′) = 0 ∀f 6= f ′
Cov(ε˜1ik, ε
1
if ) = 0 ∀k 6= f
Cov(ε˜1ik, ε
1
if ) 6= 0 if k = f
this structure implies that these shocks can be considered as pairs of bivariate normal disturbances:(
ε˜1if
ε1if
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ21f σ12f
σ12f σ
2
2f
))
(10)
or (
ε˜1i
ε1i
)
∼ N
((
0K
0F
)
,
(
Σ1 Σ
′
12
Σ12 Σ2
))
(11)
where
Σ1 = diag(σ
2
11, . . . , σ
2
1f , . . . , σ
2
1F , σ
2
1,F+1, σ
2
1,F+2)
Σ2 = diag(σ
2
21, . . . , σ
2
2f , . . . , σ
2
2F )
Σ12 =

σ121 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 0
. . .
...
0 . . . σ12f . . . 0 0 0
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 . . . σ12F 0 0

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The third source of relation between the first and second stages is general biased advice, which
is captured by the λ parameters that accompany Z2i : independent advisers and sales agents may
focus their advice on the payments or on the risk of each annuity, affecting differently the valuation
of these attributes, but the effect is the same for all firms making quotes with similar attributes.
Finally the fourth source is firm-specific biased advice, which is captured by the β that accompany
X3ijf : sales agents may emphasize the value of their firm’s quotes over other firms, and sales agents
from better-rated companies may over-emphasize the importance of firms’ solvency in order to
convince their clients to accept their offer.
4.2 Derivation of Choice Probabilities
In the first stage, retiree i chooses the intermediary that maximizes her first stage utility:
Y˜ik = 1⇔ U˜ik ≥ max
k′ 6=k
U˜ik′
Because the shocks ε˜1ik and ε˜
2
ik are independent, and also the shocks ε˜
1
ik and ε˜
1
ik′ are independent
for k 6= k′, this implies:
Pr(Y˜ik = 1|Wi,Wik, ε˜1i ) =
exp(Wiαk +Wikα+ ε˜
1
ik)∑K
k′=1 exp(Wiαk′ +Wik′α+ ε˜
1
ik′)
(12)
with the normalization that αk = 0 for k = F + 2 (entering directly).
In the second stage, conditional on the intermediary k the retiree i chooses the quote j from
insurance company f that maximizes her second stage utility:
Yijf = 1⇔ Uijf ≥ max
j′f ′ 6=jf
Uij′f ′
Because the shocks ε1if and ε
2
ijf are independent, and also the shocks ε
1
if and ε
1
if ′ are independent
for f 6= f ′, this implies that:
Pr(Yijf = 1|Xijf , βi, ε1i ) =
exp(Xijfβi + ξf + ε
1
if )∑
j′f ′ exp(Xij′f ′βi + ξf ′ + ε
1
if ′)
(13)
Integrating over the dispersion in individual preferences, we obtain:
Pr(Yijf = 1|Xijf , Zi, Y˜ ∗i , ε1i ) =
∫
exp(Xijfβi + ξf + ε
1
if )∑
j′f ′ exp(Xij′f ′βi + ξf ′ + ε
1
if ′)
φ(βi|λ,Σβ)dβi (14)
Since Y˜ ∗i and ε
1
if for f ∈ {1, ..., F} are correlated, the second stage cannot be estimated alone.
We use the conditional expectation of ε1i |ε˜1i to write:
Pr(Yijf = 1|Xijf , Zi, Y˜i, ε˜1i ) =
∫ ∫
exp(Xijfβi + ξf + ε
1
if )∑
j′f ′ exp(Xij′f ′βi + ξf ′ + ε
1
if ′)
φ(βi|λ,Σβ)φ(ε1i |ε˜1i )dβidε1i (15)
and the joint likelihood for retiree i is given by
Pr(Y˜ik = 1, Yijf = 1|Wi,Wik, Xijf )
=
∫ ∫ ∫
exp(Wiαk +Wikα+ ε˜
1
ik)∑K
k′=1 exp(Wiαk′ +Wik′α+ ε˜
1
ik′)
exp(Xijfβi + ξf + ε
1
if )∑
j′f ′ exp(Xij′f ′βi + ξf ′ + ε
1
if ′)
φ(βi|λ,Σβ)φ(ε1i |ε˜1i )φ(ε˜1i )dβidε1i dε˜1i
(16)
We maximize the joint log-likelihood, i.e., L =
∑
i Pr(Y˜ik = 1, Yijf = 1|Wi,Wik, Xijf ) via Simu-
lated Maximum Likelihood. The estimation algorithm is described in Appendix A.3.
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Table 4: First stage: attributes of intermediaries
Attributes of alternative k Coefficient
Wik α
AA+ 1.154
(0.94)
AA 1.806*
(0.94)
Firm size 0.998**
(0.14)
Availability of intermediary 0.045**
(0.01)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Parameters are statistically significant:
(*) at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level
5 Results
The model requires estimating 289 different parameters –including parameters for the first stage,
for the second stage, and for the correlation among both stages. The likelihood function for mixed
logit models usually is not globally concave and has local maxima (see Train (2003)); we considered
a grid of different starting values for the parameters and 50 Halton draws for the simulation process.
Due to computing limitations, we used a random subsample of 1,428 retirees with 84,656 quotes.
Tables 4, 5 and 7 show the results for a subset of the estimated parameters.
Table 4 presents the parameters for intermediary attributes in the first stage, α. Firm size
and availability of intermediaries are the most important determinants of intermediation choice:
sales agents from larger firms and more accessible alternatives are more likely to be chosen. The
parameters for socioeconomic characteristics (αk, not shown in the table) are mostly non-significant
and vary across alternatives. There is no clear pattern of individual characteristics in the probability
of entering with any of the sales agents; this evidence supports our hypothesis that firms are not able
to predict the specific intermediary used by a retiree nor the idiosyncratic value for the different
firms that she may have. We are only able to say that the probability of entering the system
directly using an AFP (the only option that does not require paying fees) is larger for females, for
individuals with larger pension saving funds, for those from an AFP that manages larger pension
funds on average, and for those who live in the metropolitan area. The age of the spouse do not
seem to play an important role in the decision.
Tables 5 and 7 present some of the parameters of the second stage. Table 5 shows some param-
eters related to the mean valuation of monthly payments, βi, and risk rating; in particular, it shows
the intercept for the mean valuation λ0, the effect of the first stage choice on the mean valuation
λ2 and the standard deviation of the mean valuation σβ . As expected, all retirees value positively
the monthly payment –its level increases the probability of choosing an offer– but the valuation is
larger when the firm’s risk rating is AA+ or when the retiree entered the system directly with an
AFP. There is substantial individual heterogeneity on the mean valuation of monthly payments:
the variation due to observed characteristics is significant (λ1, not shown in the table) and also due
to unobserved factors: the standard deviation is statistically different from zero.
To see more clearly how the mean valuation changes with risk rating and the intermediary, Table
6 computes the mean valuation E(βi) for a 65 year-old male with other characteristics set to their
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Table 5: Second stage: monthly payment and risk rating
Variables X1ijf Coefficient
log of monthly payment (ln P) λ0 σβi
lnP 839.8** 74.69**
(86.67) (5.87)
interaction with risk rating (base category: A or lower)
lnP*AA+ 6.33* 0.8**
(3.34) (0.18)
lnP*AA 2.93 0.09
(3.06) (0.09)
lnP*AA- 2.94 0.11
(3.03) (0.17)
lnP*A+ -1.84 0.07
(1.3) (0.4)
intermediation (λ2)
log of monthly payment (ln P) sales agent indep adviser
lnP -35.4** -18.7**
(8.2) (7.53)
interaction with risk rating (base category: A+ or lower)
lnP*AA+ -2.43** -4.19**
(0.89) (0.73)
lnP*AA -1.45 -2.72**
(0.91) (0.83)
lnP*AA- -1.5 -2.36**
(0.93) (0.84)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Parameters are statistically significant: (*) at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level
sample mean. The rows show how the valuation changes for different ratings, and the columns show
how the valuation changes for different intermediaries. We can see again that the valuation is larger
when the firm’s risk rating is AA+ or when the retiree entered the system directly with an AFP.
Now it is easier to see that the valuation increases with better rating for all intermediaries, that
the valuation is less for retirees that entered with an advisor, lower for retirees that entered with a
sales agent, and even lower if the quote is from the same firm that the sales agent used to enter.
Table 7 shows the parameters of other attributes of the quote and firm characteristics. As
expected, the valuation of guaranteed periods and lump sum withdrawal is positive and statistically
significant. Contrary to the first stage, firm size does not have a significant effect on the choice
of the second stage. Interestingly, when the quote is from the same firm that the sales agent used
to enter, there is a large value of that quote that increases the probability of choosing it, but the
valuation of the monthly payment is reduced, independently of the rating.
Firm fixed effects (not shown) are statistically different at the 10% level from the base firm for
6 of 20 firms. The estimated correlation between ε˜1if and ε
1
if (i.e., between the value of choosing a
sales agent from firm f in the first stage and the value of the offer received from the same firm f in
the second stage) is not statistically different from zero, and is almost zero (less than 0.001) in 5 of
8 cases.
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Table 6: Mean valuation E(βi) for a Male, 65 years old
Intermediary
AFP Independent Sales agent Sales agent
Rating adviser from any firm from same firm
AA+ 249.01 226.12 211.17 209.14
AA 247.03 225.61 210.17 207.23
AA- 246.86 225.8 209.95 205.75
A+ 243.3 224.6 207.89 207.89
A or lower 245.14 226.44 209.74 207.18
Table 7: Second stage: attributes of offers and firms
Variables X2ijf Coefficient
other attributes λ0 σβi
Months of guaranteed period 0.09** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01)
Has lump sum withdrawal 33.31** 38.57**
(3.04) (3.44)
Amount withdrawal 128.71** 206.88**
(9.91) (16.9)
Firm size 0.37 0
(0.4) (0.24)
AA+ -7.79** 0
(3.28) (0.65)
AA -6.76** 0.08
(3.16) (0.32)
AA- -7.29** 0.56
(3.17) (0.51)
Variables X3ijf Coefficient
offer from same firm β
Same firm 19.9**
(1.61)
interaction with offer attributes
Same firm*lnP -2.56**
(1.13)
Same firm*lnP*AA+ 0.53
(0.97)
Same firm*lnP*AA -0.38
(1.07)
Same firm*lnP*AA- -1.64
(1.11)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Parameters are statistically significant:
(*) at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level
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5.1 Willingness to pay for risk rating
We use the estimated structural parameters to obtain an estimation of the willingness to pay for
better risk rating. We define this willingness to pay as the change in the monthly payment required
to keep the level of Uijf constant when the risk rating of firm f improves from r0 to r1. Note that
this definition keeps constant both the choice and the ranking between different alternatives. If
product j from firm f is chosen in the second stage under r0, then improving the rating to r1 also
affects the value of the other products offered by the firm, while the value of the products offered
by other firms is not affected. Hence, the firm could change the payment for all its products in the
same proportion and keep constant the ranking among different offers (and also keep constant the
probability of choosing the same offer).
We compute the willingness to pay of a given retiree with mean valuation E(βi). Table 8 shows
the willigness to pay of a retiree with different individual characteristics (all other characteristics are
set to their sample mean). Most of the heterogeneity in willingness to pay comes from differences
in intermediation rather than differences in individual characteristics. Retirees that enter with an
adviser have the lowest willingness to pay, and retirees that enter directly with an AFP or with a
sales agent and receive a quote from that firm have the largest.
The model allows to disentangle the role of the different sources of correlation between interme-
diaries and willingness to pay for reputation: selection on observables, selection on unobservables,
general biased advice, and firm-specific biased advice.
The effect of general biased advice is captured by comparing the willingness to pay for different
intermediation types; i.e., this effect is captured by the differences among the three first columns
in Table 8, and proved to be economically significant. When we look at the willingness to pay for
improving the rating from AA to AA+, this effect is significant: retirees entering directly with an
AFP are willing to pay more for improving the rating than those entering with independent advisers
or with a sales agent. When we focus on the willingness to pay for improving the rating from AA-
to AA, in contrast, differences are not significant.
The effect of firm-specific biased advise is captured by the differences in willingness to pay among
retirees who entered with a sales agent from any firm, and those who entered with a sales agent
from the same firm that makes the quote; i.e., this effect is captured by the differences between the
third and forth columns in Table 8. The willingness to pay increases substantially when the quote
is from the same firm as the sales agent, for any rating.
The effect of selection on unobservables can be captured by comparing the results when we
estimate the model only with the second stage (conditional on the selection of intermediaries).
Table 9 shows the willingness to pay estimated with and without the first stage (in the first and
second panel respectively). The results are similar, which is consistent with the results for the
correlation of shocks between both stages: the larger differences are in the fourth column, i.e., for
retirees that entered with a sales agent and receive offers from the same firm.
5.2 Unconditional willingness to pay
The willingness to pay defined in the previous section is conditional on the choice of the first stage,
and assumes this choice remains constant after an improvement in the firm’s rating. The results
in Table 4 suggest, however, this is not the case: the probability that a sales agent from firm f is
chosen increases when the firm’s rating improves (especially when improving from AA- to AA). As
the (conditional) willingness to pay is higher for retirees that enter the system with a sales agent
from the same firm, this suggests that the results shown in Table 8 may be a lower bound for the
unconditional willingness to pay for risk rating. The difference between conditional an unconditional
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Table 8: Willingness to pay for risk rating, evaluated at E(βi)
Intermediary
AFP Independent Sales agent Sales agent
adviser from any firm from same firm
Risk rating: from AA to AA+
Man, age 65 1.5%** 0.09%** 0.67%** 1.71%**
(0.0052) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0138)
+ age 60 1.33%** 0.15%** 0.62%** 1.48%**
(0.0042) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0102)
+ married 1.71%** 0.7%** 1.14%** 1.89%**
(0.0045) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0114)
+ married, one kid 1.7%** 0.73%** 1.16%** 1.87%**
(0.0041) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0098)
+ savings fund * 0.5 1.68%** 0.31%** 0.89%** 1.91%**
(0.0061) (0.0012) (0.0041) (0.0159)
+ savings fund * 2 1.13%** -0.37%** 0.2%** 1.27%**
(0.004) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0101)
Woman, age 65 1.47%** 0.48%** 0.89%** 1.61%**
(0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0085)
+ age 60 1.35%** 0.47%** 0.83%** 1.45%**
(0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0069)
Risk rating: from AA- to AA
Man, age 65 0.38%** 0.03%** 0.5%** 1.97%**
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.011)
+ age 60 0.31%** 0.02%** 0.4%** 1.6%**
(0.0007) (0.00004) (0.0012) (0.0073)
+ married 0.31%** 0.05%** 0.39%** 1.44%**
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0057)
+ married, one kid 0.44%** 0.2%** 0.53%** 1.54%**
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0057)
+ savings fund * 0.5 0.37%** 0.02%** 0.49%** 1.93%**
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0108)
+ savings fund * 2 0.4%** 0.05%** 0.53%** 2.05%**
(0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0117)
Woman, age 65 0.46%** 0.22%** 0.55%** 1.56%**
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0055)
+ age 60 0.4%** 0.18%** 0.47%** 1.35%**
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0041)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, using the Delta Method.
Parameters are statistically significant: (*) at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level
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Table 9: Willingness to pay for risk rating evaluated at E(βi), with and without the first stage
Intermediary
AFP Independent Sales agent Sales agent
adviser from any firm from the same firm
Two stages
Risk rating: from AA to AA+
Man 1.5% 0.1% 0.7% 1.7%
Woman 1.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.5%
Risk rating: from AA- to AA
Man 0.4% 0% 0.5% 2%
Woman 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 1.4%
Only second stage
Risk rating: from AA to AA+
Man 1.4% 0.2% 0.7% 2.4%
Woman 1.3% 0.6% 0.9% 1.8%
Risk rating: from AA- to AA
Man 0.4% 0% 0.4% 2.1%
Woman 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 1.4%
willingness to pay captures the role of selection on observables coming from differences on ratings
(i.e., from differences on observable attributes of the firms).
Estimating the unconditional willingness to pay requires a different definition: we must focus
on keeping constant the probability of choosing the same quote rather than just Uijf , as the level
of utility for all quotes changes when the intermediary is different. Indeed, Table 6 shows a much
smaller valuation of the monthly payment when entering with a sales agent than other intermediary,
which reduces the value of all quotes received. But this change in value does not need to be compen-
sated to maintain the probability of choosing the same quote. Moreover, estimating unconditional
willingness requires simulation, as the choice of the first stage under r1 depends on the values of ε˜1ik
and ε˜2ik. The results of this section are pending.
6 Concluding remarks
The Chilean annuity market provides an exceptional opportunity to measure consumers’ willingness
to pay for reputation. Within each class of retirement product requested, retirees receive quotes
that vary only in two dimensions: the payout (monthly payment and lump sum withdrawl, if any)
and the firm risk rating. By comparing the selected quote with the set of alternatives available for
each retiree, we can estimate willingness to pay for risk rating. As the firm rating is presented as a
measure of its probability of default, willingness to pay for a better rating is regarded the same as
willingness to pay for a higher reputation of solvency.
While some retirees choose the offer with the highest payout in its class, a significant fraction
of them choose an offer with a lower payout from a better-rated company. The prevalence of this
stylized fact, however, depends on the intermediation mode chose by the retiree. We estimate a two-
stage model where individuals sequentially choose intermediaries and a pension product among all
the quotes received in the second stage. We find that willingness to pay for risk rating is statistically
and economically significant: retirees are willing to reduce their lifetime payments around 1% or
2% in order to contract an annuity to a better rated company.
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The preliminary analysis shows that retirees intermediated by sales agents tend to choose better-
rated companies that offer lower payouts, while those intermediated by independent advisers tend to
choose worse-rated companies that offer higher payouts. This analysis is consistent with our results:
willingness to pay for a better risk rating is higher among retirees intermediated by sales agents
than among those who are intermediated by independent advisers. Heterogeneity in willingness to
pay may reflect ex-ante consumers’ heterogeneity, buy it is also the consequence of biased advice.
The welfare impact of this biased advise is non-trivial, however: retirees being advised to select
quotes with higher payments may be subject to a higher default risk.
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Appendix
A.1 Basic retirement options
To access any funds saved in the pension system during the accumulation phase, the retiree must
retire through SCOMP and choose one of the options available to her. The retiree has four basic
retirement options: annuity, programmed withdrawal, combined annuity with programmed with-
drawal, and temporary allowance with deferred annuity. As their names indicate, the last two
are combinations of the first (commonly known as combined annuities), and are less common as
retirement options.
The annuity is the most natural example of retirement option and the usual economic prescrip-
tion for risk averse individuals, but similarly as other countries it is not the most common option,
which is still a puzzle to the literature. In Chile the annuitization rate is larger than in other
countries. According to the regulatory agency, 55.7% of retirees choose an annuity or a combined
annuity; in our sample data, 38.6% of retirees choose a standard annuity and 23% choose a combined
annuity. Under the standard annuity, the retiree transfers the property of the savings fund to the
insurance company in exchange for a fixed monthly payment up to the death of the retiree. This
transfer is irreversible. The law in Chile requires that after the death of the retiree, the payments
continue to the legal beneficiaries: 60% of the monthly payment while the spouse is alive, 40% of
the monthly payment while there are children under 25 years old, and 40% of the monthly payment
while children with disability are alive; this requirements are naturally considered by the insurance
company when giving quotes. In any case, it is usually understood that the upside of buying an
annuity is the insurance against the longevity risk –outliving your own assets– and the insurance
against inflation –due to the real currency used for these transactions–while the downside is the loss
of inheritance, specially if the retiree dies early.
The second retirement option available is a programmed withdrawal. According to the regulatory
agency, 44.3% of retirees choose a programmed withdrawal; in our sample data it is a 38.4%. This
option allows the withdrawals of predetermined amounts of funds on a regular monthly basis, so
even under this option the retiree cannot obtain all the savings fund at once. The retiree maintains
the property of her savings fund but it continues under the administration of an AFP (the same
one that managed the savings fund in the accumulation phase or a different one). The AFP invests
the funds, pays the retiree a sum each month, and charges an administration fee. The sum paid
each month varies with a schedule, and it is updated each year according to the size of the available
funds, the rate of return on investments, the retiree’s conditional life expectancy, and the rules
set by the regulatory agency. This updating rule has the result that the schedule of payments is
decreasing over time at an increasing rate. The retiree may die before the savings fund runs out –in
which case the rest is used as inheritance– or the savings may ran out while the retiree is still alive
–in which case she may qualify for the minimal pension provided by the state.
Because of these characteristics, it is usually understood that programmed withdrawal may be
a better option for retirees that are less risk averse, that have other savings outside the pension
system, that have large fund sizes that are less likely to run out, and that may want to continue
working after retirement: the system allows to adjust the sum paid each month to the minimal
pension provided by the state, decreasing the progressive tax burden and leaving more savings for
the future. The law also forces retirees with low savings to choose a programmed withdrawal: if the
funds available to the retiree are not enough to buy an annuity higher than the minimal pension
provided by the state, then she must choose a programmed withdrawal and receive the minimal
pension as payment until the savings fund runs out, and receive the minimal pension from the
state from that point on. Therefore, programmed withdrawal is a more popular option in the two
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extremes of the socioeconomic spectrum. Retirees with programmed withdrawal may come back to
the SCOMP system to buy an annuity with the remaining funds; these individuals are included in
our data and represent aproximately 25% of the retirees.
The last two options available –combined annuities– are combinations of annuities and pro-
grammed withdrawal. In the combined annuity with programmed withdrawal, the retiree splits her
savings fund in two parts as she wishes, and with each part buys an annuity and a programmed
withdrawal respectively. In the temporary allowance with delayed annuity, the retiree again splits
her savings fund in two parts: one is used to buy an annuity that will start paying in a future date,
and the other one is used meanwhile as a programmed withdrawal.
A.2 The retirement process
Workers can legally retire once they reach 65 years old for males and 60 years old for females.
Workers in the private sector can keep their jobs after retiring, but this legal process allows them to
access their pension savings funds. Workers may also opt for an early retirement if their savings fund
is large enough to meet certain conditions.7 Around 40% of retirees correspond to early retirement.
The retirement process starts when the soon-to-be retiree approaches an office of her pension
fund administrator (AFP) and fills the Retirement Application and Declaration of Beneficiaries.
The AFP has 10 days to issue the Certificate of Balance, which contains the information about
the savings fund – specific accounts, amounts, and composition of stocks and options– and the
personal and demographical information of the retiree and the legal beneficiaries –spouse, children,
and parents. This certificate is sent to the retiree and entered into SCOMP, and expires after 35
days. According to the regulatory agency (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros SVS), for our
sample period (August 2004 to April 2013) the system has issued 492,986 Certificates of Balance.
With this certificate, the retiree can request quotes of different pension products. As noted
above, there are four basic retirement options: annuities, programmed withdrawals, or two different
combinations of them. The retiree decides the options to request and the atributes for each option.
This request is entered into SCOMP by the intermediary. Of the total of Certificates of Balance
issued, 333,560 are used to enter a request for quotes. The retiree can enter up to three requests
for each Certificate of Balance issued –in average the retirees enter 1.34 requests per Certificate of
Balance, which adds to 446,421 requests. In our sample we have information for 424,623 requests.
The SCOMP system assigns a unique numeric code to the Certificate of Balance and the cor-
responding request for quotes, and sends the (otherwise anonymous) financial and demographical
information to all the authorized life insurance companies – the personal information of the retiree
and the type of intermediary are omitted and thus unknown to the companies. There are 21 autho-
rized companies in the sample period. If a company wants to give a quote to the retiree for some
or all the pension products requested, it enters the offer(s) into SCOMP before a due date set by
the system. The payouts of the quotes are entered in UF (Unidades de Fomento), a currency that
is daily corrected for inflation and is the standard unit of account for long term contracts in Chile;
therefore the offers are set in real terms. Within the next 4 working days after the request for quotes
was entered, the system issues a Certificate of Offers to the retiree. This Certificate of Offers is a
letter sent to the retiree’s home address, containing all the quotes arranged in a previously specified
fashion, and is valid for 12 working days.
With the Certificate of Offers, the retiree may do one of the following things: choose any of the
quotes in the Certificate of Offers, ask for an outside offer, ask for an auction, make a new request
to the system, or cancel the application for retirement and start the process again in the future.
7A worker is elegible for early retirement if her savings fund is large enough to buy an annuity at least 70% of her
average wage from the previous 10 years, and at least 150% of the minimal pension provided by the state.
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According to the regulatory agency, 128,506 retirees choose an offer included in the Certificate of
Offers. The outside offer occurs when the retiree goes directly to an insurance company with a valid
quote and negotiates individually; the outside offer must also be entered into SCOMP and must be
from the same class and a higher payout than the offer in the Certificate of Offers. This option is
very popular; according to the regulatory agency, 114,903 retirees choose an outside offer. In our
sample –only retirees that choose an immediate annuity– 87.3% of the retirees that choose annuities
ask for an outside offer but to a few companies –these represent 3.74% of the total offers– and 84%
choose an outside offer.The auction occurs when the retiree goes to her AFP and selects up to three
insurance companies with a valid quote from the same class to run a first-price auction; if at least
two companies decide to participate then the retiree is automatically assigned to the company that
bids the highest monthly payment. Auctions are very rare: in 10 years of operation the system has
only run 89 auctions. Finally, the application can be cancelled actively by the retiree (for example,
if she wants to enter the system with a different intermediary), but also when the Certificate of
Balance or the Certificate of Offers expire before a final decision is entered into the system. This
also happens very frequently: of the 446,421 requests made to the system, 202,923 (45%) of the
requests are cancelled; similarly, in our data 30.93% of the requests are cancelled. The retiree can
only access her savings funds if she retire, hence everyone that cancelled a request should come back
to the system in the future.
To accept one of the quotes in the Certificate of Offers or one received afterwards, the retiree
must sign a Certificate of Acceptance with the chosen insurance company or with her AFP, which
has to enter the information into SCOMP. If the retiree is choosing a quote that does not have the
higher payout in its class, the system will issue a form with a declaration that must be signed by
the retiree acknowledging the gap. The retirement process finishes when the AFP that manages the
retiree’s savings account transfers the savings fund to the selected provider. After the retirement
process finishes, SCOMP can only inform each company on the relative position in terms of payout
that its quotes had in each respective class. It is not allowed to disclose information on the selected
provider, the relative position of other companies, or the payouts quoted.
The SCOMP system can also be used by people that already retired under programmed with-
drawal but would like to switch to a different option (25% of our sample data), by people that
qualify for disability pension (12.5% according to the regulatory agency, 13% in our sample data),
or by the legal beneficiaries of a deceased worker that inherit the savings funds (11.23% according to
the regulatory agency, 1.7% in our sample data). These three cases are subject to the same process
described above, but the law specifies some differences for each case.
A.3 Estimation Algorithm
We estimate the model described outlined in Section 4 by using Simulated Maximum Likelihood,
starting from Kenneth Train’s Matlab code “mxlmsl”.8 We augment this code to incorporate the
first stage and to account for the correlation between the first and second stage. Taking D draws,
the likelihood function corresponds to:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
lnLi
N∑
i=1
ln
[
1
D
D∑
d=1
Pr(Y˜ di = k) Pr(Y
d
i = jf |Y˜ di = k)
]
8Ww thank Professor Train for his code available online at http://eml.berkeley.edu/ train/software.html
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To incorporate the individual heterogeneity in preferences in the second stage through E(βi),
and the correlation between the first and second stage through the joint distribution of (ε˜1i , ε
1
i ), we
use two simple “tricks”:
1. The distribution of βi implies that
βi = λ0 + λ1Z
1′
i + λ2Z
2′
i + Λβuβi
where Λβ is the Cholesky decomposition of Σβ and uβi is a vector of independent N(0, 1)
shocks. So far we assume Σβ is diagonal, therefore Λβ is also diagonal and contains the
standard deviation of each parameter βi, σβ . Then, for each draw d, in the second stage the
value of a quote j from firm f is given by
Udijf = Xijfλ0 +Xijfλ1Z
1′
i +Xijfλ2Z
2′
i + ξf +Xijfσβu
d
βi + ε
1d
if + ε
2
ijf (17)
Therefore our model for the second stage can be easily adapted to Train’s algorithm by includ-
ing the interactions between Xijf and [Z1i , Z
2
i ] with fixed parameters, and adding a random
parameter (with positive standard deviation) for Xijf . We also include the normalizations
discussed in Section 4.1.1.
2. According to equation (10), the shocks for the first and second stage can be considered as
pairs of bivariate normal disturbances:(
ε˜1if
ε1if
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ21f σ12f
σ12f σ
2
2f
))
By the Cholesky decomposition, this implies that there exists numbers (l1f , l2f , l3f ) such that:(
l1f 0
l2f l3f
)(
l1f l2f
0 l3f
)
=
(
σ21f σ12f
σ12f σ
2
2f
)
(18)
and therefore (
ε˜1if
ε1if
)
=
(
l1f 0
l2f l3f
)(
u˜1if
u1if
)
=
(
l1f u˜1if
l2f u˜1if + l3fu1if
)
(19)
where again, u˜1if and u1if correspond to pairs of independent N(0, 1) shocks, with:
l1f = σ1f
l2f = ρ12fσ2f =
σ12f
σ1f
l3f = σ2f
√
1− ρ212f
where ρ12f is the correlation between the two shocks (ρ12f =
σ12f
σ1fσ2f
).
With this “trick”, for each draw d, in the first stage the value of an intermediary k is
U˜dik = Wiαk +Wikα+ σ1ku˜
d
1ik + ε˜
2
ik (20)
and in the second stage the value of an offer jf is:
Udijf =Xijfλ0 +Xijfλ1Z
1′
i +Xijfλ2Z
2′
i + ξf
+Xijfσβu
d
βi + ρ12fσ2f u˜
d
1if + σ2f
√
1− ρ212fud1if + ε2ijf
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This “trick” of including the same draw u˜d1if from the value of the first stage into the value of
the second stage when k = f –with a different parameter– is the same as using the conditional
distribution φ(ε1i |ε˜1i ) in the second stage.
Note also that the term σ2f
√
1− ρ212fud1if is equivalent to adding in the code a random
parameter to the firm fixed effects ξf , with the normalization of E(ξf ′) = 0 for a given f ′.
With these two tricks, in each simulation a draw d corresponds to a vector of independent N(0, 1)
shocks udi = [u
d
βi, u˜
d
1i, u
d
1i], where the vector u
d
βi is used to estimate the heterogeneity in the second
stage valuation parameters βi, the vector u˜d1i is used to estimate the heterogeneity in the value of
the first stage, and the vector ud1i is used to estimate the heterogeneity in the value of the second
stage.
These two tricks imply that the parameters estimated by the code correspond to the following
parameters in our model:
1. Fˆ : fixed parameters of the second stage, correspond to:
(a) λˆ1: effect of the interactions between Xijf and Z1i , or the effect of individual character-
istics on the mean valuation of the present value of monthly payments.
(b) λˆ2: effect the interactions between Xijf and Z2i = Y˜
∗
i , or the effect of general biased
advice from the intermediary.
2. Bˆ: mean of random coefficients of the second stage, correspond to:
(a) λˆ0: “intercept” of the mean valuation of quotes attributes.
(b) ξˆf : to control for endogeneity of prices we include a dummy for each firm f - the mean
will correspond to the firm fixed effect. We require the normalization that E(ξf ′) = 0
for a given f ′.
3. Wˆ : standard deviations of random coefficients of the second stage, correspond to:
(a) σˆβ : SD of the valuations for the quotes attributes.
(b) σˆ2f
√
1− ρˆ212f : the SD of the firm dummies estimate the conditional variance of the
distribution φ(ε1i |ε˜1i ), to control for selection on unobservables.
4. Fˆ0: fixed parameters of the first stage, correspond to αˆk, the parameters for Wi.
5. Fˆ0ij : fixed parameters of the first stage, correspond to αˆ, the parameters for Wik to control
for selection on observables.
6. Wˆ0: SD of random coefficients of the first stage, correspond directly to σˆ1k, the standard
deviation of ε˜1i . The estimation of Wˆ0 was included simply as the parameter that goes with
the draws u˜d1ik.
7. WˆS: the draws for the first stage u˜d1ik go directly into the second stage when k = f , with
parameter WˆS = ρˆ12f σˆ2f that estimate the conditional mean of the distribution φ(ε1i |ε˜1i ), to
control for selection on unobservables.
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With the estimated parameters for the Cholesky decomposition, it is possible to obtain the
bivariate normal distribution that accounts for the correlation between the first and second stage:
σˆ2f =
√
WˆS
2
f + Wˆ
2
f =
√
l22f + l
2
3f =
√
ρˆ212f σˆ
2
2f + σˆ
2
2f (1− ρˆ212f )
ρˆ12f =
WˆSf√
WˆS
2
f + Wˆ
2
f
=
l2f
σˆ2f
To obtain the SD of the estimated parameters it is possible to use the Delta Method:
g(WSf ,Wf ) =
(
g1(WSf ,Wf )
g2(WSf ,Wf )
)
=

√
WS2f +W
2
f
WSf√
WS2f+W
2
f

Then, if ΣWS,W,f is the covariance matrix of the estimates WSf ,Wf , then the covariance matrix
for the parameters of the bivariate normal distribution is given by
∇g′ΣWS,W,f∇g
with
∇g =
(
∂g1
∂WSf
∂g2
∂WSf
∂g1
∂Wf
∂g2
∂Wf
)
=

WSf√
WS2f+W
2
f
W 2f√
WS2f+W
2
f
3
Wf√
WS2f+W
2
f
−WSfWf√
WS2f+W
2
f
3

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